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1. Investment, growth, and economic
policy
Sustainable growth requires investment, i.e. the
accumulation of fixed and human capital. In a
market economy, private business accumulates
fixed capital to create capacity for future produc-
tion. Investment in infrastructure, i.e., in transport
and network supplies such as energy transmis-
sion and distribution, telecommunications, water
and sanitation is often made out of public budgets
but with the participation of private enterprises.
Moreover, long-term growth requires that the
technical progress embodied in new capital
equipment be supported by appropriate skills in
the workforce, i.e. by human capital. These skills,
in turn, depend on the education and the health of
the workforce. As markets tend to under-invest in
human capital, the main way to accumulate it is
via public expenditures on health and education.
Empirical research suggests significant links be-
tween long-term economic growth and an econ-
omy’s stocks of fixed capital, infrastructure, and
human capital.
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Growth impulses from investment do not
come about automatically but need policy sup-
port. Private investment decisions depend on the
returns that investors expect and on the uncer-
tainties associated with these returns. Expecta-
                                                     
1 First published as Chapter 5 in: Stephan von Cramon-
Taubadel et al., Towards Higher Standards of Living. An
Economic Agenda for Ukraine. A Program of Work for the
new Government of Ukraine, German Advisory Group on
Economic Reforms with the Government of Ukraine and
Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Kiev,
ecember 2004. D
2 See Barro R. and X. Sala-i-Martin (2003): Economic
Growth, Chapter 12.
tions are shaped by the investment climate, which
is a general term for the factors that provide in-
centives or disincentives for private sector in-
vestment. These include:
•  taxation, policies toward investment financ-
ing, and the institutional and regulatory
framework. All of this defines a critical role for
deliberate public policies towards private in-
vestment, over and above macroeconomic,
fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies
and political stability;
•  the quality and quantity of the available infra-
structure motivates the importance of public
and private infrastructure investment for
shaping the investment climate.
Policy support, however, should never crowd out
private activity. In Ukraine, the prevailing ap-
proach towards allocating public funds to support
investment is still interventionist. Public invest-
ment in Ukraine helps to preserve old structures.
It flows into areas with doubtful rationale for long-
term state involvement, while budgeting rules lack
transparent priorities and rules-based selection
criteria. The result is long, primarily political and
interest group-driven bargaining processes for
public aid. Investment in infrastructure only rarely
involves the private sector and investment in
human capital does not efficiently exhaust avail-
able resources. Public support for private invest-
ment follows an approach of selectively targeting
industries and/or regions in attempting to pick
winners at significant cost to the economy yield-
ing unclear benefits.
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The solution to these problems is to limit the
scope for state interventionism. This chapter
outlines ways of achieving this objective with the
overall goal of subjecting the allocation of public
funds to support investment to transparent and
rules-based procedures.
2. Public investment activity
2.1. The impact of public investment
Investment in Ukraine is by now mostly do-
mestic enterprise investment (Table 1). The
shrinking economy in the 1990s led to sub-
stantial revenue shortfalls for public budgets.
The ensuing fiscal austerity had a much more
severe impact on public investment than on
current expenditures, implying some deteriora-
tion of the infrastructure. Following macroeco-
nomic stabilisation, the GDP share of all public
investment expenditures, including changes in
inventory and capital transfers, has recovered
from a low of 1.3% of GDP, according to World
Bank data, to 5% in 2003, according to 2003
Budget Act data.
Table 1 Gross fixed capital formation in Ukraine, % of GDP





Total fixed capital investment 13.5 13.9 16.0 16.8 19.3 17.2
 Out of public budgets 1.6 1.3 1.5 1.5 2.1 1.8
   By enterprises 11.9 12.6 14.5 15.3 17.2 15.4
Net FDI inflows 1.6 1.9 2.1 1.7 2.8 2.3
Note: At 19.3%, Ukraine’s share of total fixed investment in GDP was within reasonable limits for a transition economy in 2003:
the UN Economic Commission for Europe’s Common Database reveals a median of 21.1% for a sample of 25 transition
economies in 2002. Public fixed capital investment is fixed capital investment directly financed out of state and local budgets.
Public capital transfers to enterprises are part of enterprise investment, independent of the nature of the enterprise
Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004, and IER calculations
Although there are significant links between
long-term economic growth and an economy’s
stocks of fixed capital stock, infrastructure and
human capital, there is no statistically significant
cross-country relationship between public invest-
ment and per capita GDP levels or growth. Public
investment often involves large projects creating
vested interests with inefficient outcomes, so the
quality of investment and the efficiency of invest-
ment budgeting rules matter a lot in this relation-
ship, as does private versus public ownership in
infrastructure. Accordingly, shares of public in-
vestment in GDP sufficient to support sustainable
growth are certainly much smaller than the high-
est levels indicated in Graph 1.
Graph 1 Public investment as a share of GDP: Selected transition economies,





















Note: Public investment is all consolidated capital expenditure financed out of the central or local budgets. In addition to pur-
chases of fixed assets, this especially includes capital transfers to enterprises, to the population, or abroad. Most OECD coun-
tries’ public investment to GDP ratios are between 3 and 5 per cent
Sources: IMF, Government Finance Statistics and International Financial Statistics, World Bank, World Development Indica-
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After recent increases, current public invest-
ment levels in Ukraine are comparable to OECD
levels and do not appear to be insufficiently low
(Graph 1). The impact of public investment on the
Ukrainian economy is thus less a problem of the
amount than of the efficiency of investment ex-
penditures.
Above all, efficiency requires good public in-
vestment budgeting rules. The relevant Ukrainian
rules and regulations lack transparent priorities
and rules-based selection criteria for selecting
between competing projects. For example, as a
rule cost-benefit analysis is not applied. Decisions
on capital expenditures are not fully integrated
with respect to the decision making bodies, the
different components of capital expenditures,
capital versus current expenditures, and planning
horizons. As resource ceilings are set only in the
final stages of the project selection process,
capital transfer decisions are prone to drawn-out
bargaining. The process is thus biased towards
creating excess demand for public funds, and
results in too much state aid to loss-making pub-
lic enterprises.
2.2 The scope for public investment in
Ukraine
Public investment should be motivated by market
failure arguments and by distributional objectives.
Hence, the strongest grounds for public invest-










ground for public in-
vestment to ensure










nore the social return
of human capital in-
vestment.
                                                     
4 This point is also made in the introduction to Chapter 3 on
the social security system in Ukraine.
The prevailing government investment priori-
ties in Ukraine
5 appear dominated by intervention
on private markets motivated by only temporarily
valid transition-specific concerns over the fuel
and energy complex and the implementation of
energy and resources saving technologies, agri-
culture, and the medical and microbiological
complex. In fact, core public activities receive only
roughly one third (36.3%) of all public capital ex-
penditures in Ukraine in 2002 (Graph 2). Another
third is composed of investment in environment,
health, education and culture, much of which rightly
responds to equity considerations and spill-over
effects of these goods to society as a whole.
Capital expenditures on functions with only some
or even doubtful rationale for long-term state inter-
vention, especially the broad sector of all “eco-
nomic activities” and utilities, attract public invest-
ment in the same order of magnitude (34.5%).
More than half of this is state aid in the form of
capital transfers to publicly owned enterprises.
The share of all capital transfers to enterprises
in consolidated public investment was 24% in
2002 and has since even risen sharply to 52% in
the budget for 2004. Most central government
capital transfers go to coal mining, while capital
transfers to utilities are financed out of local
budgets. Public investment expenditures on eco-
nomic activities and utilities appear excessively
high and can be re-allocated over the medium
term.
                                                     
5 As defined in the ‘Concept of Regulating Investment Activity
er the Conditions of Market Transformation of the Econ-
omy’ of January 1, 1995, No. 384, with amendments of Feb-
ruary 15, 2002, and the MoE ‘Order On Approving the Decree
on Assessment and Selection of Investment Projects’.
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Graph 2 Consolidated budget capital expenditures in Ukraine



















































































































































Note: Public investment is defined as in the note to Graph 1. Utilities include other (minor)
housing and communal services capital expenditures. Public investment in utilities is fi-
nanced out of local budgets. While most economic activity expenditures are financed out of
the central budget, road financing is split between central and local budgets




2.3 Public infrastructure investment and the
scope for private involvement
Transport and network supplies, such as energy
transmission and distribution, telecommunica-
tions and water and sanitation are the backbone
of a country’s infrastructure. An adequate infra-
structure is growth enhancing since it improves
productivity and competitiveness, reduces pov-
erty, contributes to environmental stability, links
people, and is also a major decision criterion for
private investment decisions. Given the poor
state of infrastructure in Ukraine and limited
budget resources, investment in new infrastruc-
ture and maintenance of the existing stock repre-
sents a serious challenge.
Involving the private sector in public infra-
structure investment in the form of public-private-
partnerships (PPPs) can reduce the burden on
the public budget, especially when there is a po-
tential for revenue generation. The financing of
road construction provides a classic opportunity,
usually involving concession schemes through
which private firms finance and build the project
and then operate it for a pre-defined period of
time, recovering the investment by collecting user
tolls.
Although the legal basis for such concessions
exists in Ukraine, World Bank data indicate that
between 1997 and 2002 the sum of private and
public investments in completed infrastructure
projects with private participation were limited to
USD 338.5 m. Most of this is in natural gas and
electricity transmission, none in road construc-
tion. Attempts at making use of road concession
schemes have only started in 2002 when conces-
sion agreements were reached concerning con-
struction and use of roads between Lviv and
Brody and Krakivets and Lviv.
In general, the private sector has so far been
reluctant to be involved in PPPs. As the list of
potential objects that could be financed via PPPs
is extensive, this is likely to be connected to poor
policies and inadequate regulations that increase
the risk for private investors. High contracting and
bidding costs might be due to non-transparent
tender conditions. Underdeveloped domestic
capital markets contribute to expensive financing
terms. To complicate matters, few sub-sovereign
governments are creditworthy, and an unbal-
anced approach towards decentralisation has
increased the share of infrastructure that falls
under the jurisdiction of provinces and municipali-
ties that do not have adequate sources of fi-
nance.
6
                                                     
6 See Chapter 4 on regional development in Ukraine for
proposals on how to improve this situation.
2.4 Human capital accumulation via public
expenditures on education and health
The human capital of an economy lies in the skills
of its workforce. As both current and capital ex-
penditures on health care and education generate
a future stream of benefits in the form of im-
proved skills in the workforce, both expenditure
types meet the economic definition of investment.
However, individuals often ignore the social re-
turns of human capital investment, which is to say
that they ignore the effect that their health and
education has on the productivity of society as a
whole. Therefore, private markets tend to under-
invest in skills, and human capital accumulation
largely depends on public health and education
expenditures.
World Bank data indicate a positive link be-
tween the GDP share of public expenditures on
health care and education and the level of eco-
nomic development. Specifically, in 2001 high-
income countries spent on average 11.5% of
GDP on public expenditures on health and edu-
cation, while middle-income countries spent 7.6%
and low-income countries 4.2%. Ukraine’s 7.1%,
of which 2.9% are on health care and 4.2% go to
education, represent the highest figure of all CIS
countries represented in Graph 1.
However, GDP share data do not reveal in-
formation on how much public expenditure
reaches individuals. In Ukraine, the government
has committed itself to provide equal and free
access to health care services. Still, per capita
expenditure on health care is one of the lowest in
the sample of countries in Graph 1. As research
indicates that the dominant direction of causality
is from human capital to growth, and taking into
account the pressure of an ageing population
there is a clear-cut need for reform. There is also
an evidence of insufficient provision of fixed as-
sets investment in this sphere.
7 In particular, the
accumulated depreciation of fixed assets in
health care and education (39% and 42%, re-
spectively) are among the highest in the econ-
omy. In addition, evidence of large shadow pay-
ments to doctors and teachers in Ukraine sug-
gests that funding is insufficient even for the cur-
rent level of economic development. Also, low
quality services in rural areas can be connected
to insufficient funding of local budgets.
Even more importantly, as already demon-
strated for public investment expenditures on
fixed capital, spending levels are less relevant for
the impact of public human capital investment on
the economy than spending efficiency. The criti-
cism of budgeting rules in the area of fixed capital
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spending also applies to investments in human
capital. In summary, due to inadequacy of funding
and inefficiency of spending, only part of the pub-
lic expenditures on health care and education in
Ukraine represents effective investment in human
capital formation.
3. Public support for private investment
Private investment in physical business equip-
ment provides the main thrust of capital forma-
tion. In an open market economy, both private
domestic investment and foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) contribute to growth impulses.
Public policy to further private investment may
in principle follow two different patterns; a selec-
tive targeting or an institutional framework ap-
proach.
8
•  Public policy towards private domestic in-
vestment and FDI may be based on specific
support for pre-defined priority sectors, re-
gions, and/or types of investment.
•  Public policy towards private investment may
concentrate on providing a good business
environment and institutional framework for
investment.
                                                     
While the institutional framework approach is
advocated by international organisations as well
as by us, Ukraine has so far leaned towards a
selective targeting approach in providing public
support to private investment (Box 1). Specifi-
cally, as direct transfers out of the budget are
mainly reserved for supporting public rather than
private enterprises, public support for private
investment in Ukraine comes mainly in form of
credits out of the budget and, most importantly,
via the provision of different forms of tax prefer-
ences.
However, selective targeting represents a
risky strategy. Deciding which investment projects
to subsidise, how much to subsidise them and by
means of which instruments involves difficult
political and economic choices. Authorities risk
finding themselves over-subsidising projects or
creating unintended economic disturbances if
they do not succeed in ‘picking the winners’. At
the more practical level, incentive programs are
often administratively burdensome.
Targeted policies often lack transparency.
This relates both to approval procedures, which
typically result in rent-seeking activities, and to
the assessment of costs and benefits of invest-
ment projects. As the instruments applied are not
explicitly targeted to measurable objectives, it is
difficult to evaluate the alternatives and the effi-
ciency of the often costly measures (Table 3). In
Box 1 Selective targeting to support private investment in Ukraine
Sector-specific incentives allow targeting investment to specific sectors while special economic zones aim at
furthering investment in particular regions. Examples of sector-specific supporting programs in Ukraine in-
clude: Stimulating the production of cars in Ukraine, State support of plane construction in Ukraine, Stimulat-
ing the development of agricultural sector, and Bronetechnika of Ukraine. State support to facilitate invest-
ment in these sectors covers granting privileges on major taxes such as VAT on output, EPT, import duties,
VAT on imported inputs and the land tax.
Ukraine has also established 11 special economic zones and 72 special regimes of investment activity that
were created mainly for the purpose of attracting foreign investors to foster regional development and stimu-
late investment and innovative activity. Special economic zones usually involve the exemption from VAT and
import duties on imported inputs, as well as exemption from EPT and the land tax.
Table 3 Costs of tax preferences in Ukraine, % of GDP
2001 est. 2002 est. 2003 est. 2004 proj.
EPT 1.3 0.8 0.4 0.3
VAT 2.1 2.5 1.9 1.6
Import duties 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3
Land tax 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4
Excises 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Total revenues foregone 4.3 4.5 3.2 2.7
Note: Table 3 contains estimates on all tax preferences, including those explicitly aimed at providing investment incentives.
However, in as much as all tax preferences tend to have intended and unintended investment implications, Table 3 figures
effectively represent upper-bound estimates for private investment-related costs of tax preferences in Ukraine
Sources: Ministry of Finance and State Tax Administration of Ukraine, IMF, and IER estimates
8 There are obvious parallels between this distinction and the
distinction between vertical and horizontal approaches to




fact, many incentives are of little relevance to the
investors being targeted, despite high costs to the
authority. For example, investment in research
and development requires a functioning patent
system to secure long-term benefits. In the ab-
sence of effective patent protection, any subsidi-
sation is a very costly and ineffective substitute.
For these reasons targeted tax incentives are
usually not consistent with international best
practice in the area of investment support. We
recommend that improving all aspects of the
institutional framework for private investment in
Ukraine be given priority over selective targeted
policies. Especially, we argue against discrimina-
tion by type of investment under any circum-
stances and cannot recommend the use of in-
centives targeted at specific sectors or regions
without prior substantial institutional framework
reforms.
4 Policy recommendations
The ultimate objective of our recommendations is
to limit the scope for public interventionism and
thus to increase the impact of investment in fixed
capital, infrastructure and human capital on the
long-term growth prospects of the Ukrainian
economy. This can and must be achieved at cur-
rent levels of public spending relative to GDP, in
order to safeguard the sustainability of public
finances.
9 The key is to increase the efficiency of
both public investment and public support of pri-
vate investment.
4.1 Proposals to increase the efficiency of
public investment activity
The impact of current levels of public investment
relative to GDP can be increased by a number of
short- and medium-run measures.
a) Public investment budgeting rules and
regulations can be improved immediately. This
requires:
•  transparent priorities and the application of
standardised rules-based selection criteria,
such as cost-benefit analysis, in order to
eliminate at least the poorest investment
projects from the selection process;
•  smoother integration of capital expenditures
in the budgeting process. Multi-year devel-
opment programs should be regularly up-
dated against actual budgets. A medium-term
planning procedure has to be implemented
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requiring medium-term budget estimates for
spending units. Combined with efficient proj-
ect selection, this helps policymakers to see
the long-term consequences of their deci-
sions. Initially, capital and maintenance deci-
sions should be harmonised by introducing
multi-year controls where all project propos-
als must include a task description, a state-
ment of the financial resources required over
the life of the project, and a cost-benefit
analysis. This requires the establishment of a
database to monitor spending and the prog-
ress of multi-year public projects; and
•  resource ceilings in project selection should
be set early, to minimize the demand for pub-
lic funds and to avoid long bargaining proc-
esses for public aid.
b) In the near future, socially useful infrastructure
investment can be stepped up by increasing the
involvement of the private sector, especially in
revenue generating projects.
At the central government level, this concerns
concession schemes for road financing. On local
level, this could involve utilities and local trans-
port. Advances in regulatory practices and in the
transparency of public tender conditions are clear
pre-requisites for progress in this area, to over-
come the reluctance of the private sector to be
involved in PPPs. In the end, private involvement
in public infrastructure projects can be an efficient
instrument for increasing investment in infra-
structure and simultaneously concentrating lim-
ited budget resources on investment in core pub-
lic activities and in human capital formation via
increasing public expenditures on education and
health. The latter, however, has to be coupled to
reforms in these two sectors.
c) In the medium term, this reallocation of public
investment can be further strengthened by
phasing out state aid in form of capital trans-
fers to public enterprises, especially to coal
mining and utilities.
Related social policy objectives can be more
efficiently dealt with by temporary social assis-
tance to households rather than sustained capital
transfers to enterprises. This would again allow
for increases in public investment in core public
activities and in human capital formation.
See Chapter 1. Maintaining Ukraine’s hard-won macroeco-
nomic stability is an absolute priority.
4.2 Proposals to increase the effectiveness
of public support for private investment
In line with private investor preferences and inter-
national experience, we recommend replacing
prevailing selective targeting practices by a con-
sistent set of non-discriminatory policies, basedInvestment Policies: Removing State Interventionism in Ukraine
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on the OECD Guiding Principles for Policies to-
ward Attracting FDI (Box 2), bearing in mind that
a non-discriminatory policy approach dictates that
these principles are applicable to domestic
private investment as well. These policies should
be drafted and published in a document outlining
Ukraine’s Guidelines for Public Support of Private
Investment.
Box 2 OECD Guiding Principles for Policies toward Attracting FDI
1.  Safeguard public sector transparency, including an impartial system of courts and law enforcement
2.  Ensure that rules and their implementation rest on the principle of non-discrimination between for-
eign and domestic enterprises and are in accordance with international law
3.  Provide the right for free transfers related to and protecting against arbitrary expropriation
4.  Put in place adequate frameworks for a healthy competitive environment in the domestic business
sector
5.  Remove obstacles to international trade
6.  Redress those aspects of the tax system that constitute barriers to FDI
7.  Ensure that public spending is adequate and relevant
Source: OECD, Checklist for Foreign Direct Investment Incentive Policies, Paris, 2003
Translated into the Ukrainian context, these prin-
ciples imply that:
•  All instruments of public support for private
investment that constitute outright state aid
(including state credits or state guarantees
for bank credits) should be cancelled. Aid is
suitable to correct imperfections in the do-
mestic environment that cannot otherwise be
addressed.
•  Such imperfections exist in Ukrainian agri-
culture, at least as long as land cannot be
used as collateral to secure investment loans.
In the meantime, a second-best instrument to
alleviate credit constraints is interest rate
subsidisation rather than direct budget aid or
quasi-fiscal aid via the banking system. To
ensure efficient allocation of subsidised cred-
its, the recommendations made above for
public investment budgeting rules and regu-
lations should be applied to such support for
agriculture as well.
•  A similar imperfection may temporarily exist
in the limited access of small and medium
enterprises (SMEs) to the capital market,
costly access to information, and relatively
high administrative costs. However, interest
rate subsidisation is no permanent substitute
for steps to ease the entry and exit of enter-
prises, to increase access to information and
streamline tax administration.
•  Tax investment incentives targeted at specific
regional and/or sectoral development are in-
ferior to consistent non-discriminatory policies
and institutional improvements: tax legislation
needs to be simplified, discriminatory provi-
sions should be eliminated. Depreciation
policies need to be aligned with best practice
accounting rules in order to avoid distorting
firms’ production decisions. To encourage
foreign investors, the government should fol-
low the provisions of bilateral agreements
that ensure the avoidance of double-taxation.
•  Sustainable FDI promotion presupposes
stable conditions for investors. This limits the
government’s scope for reforming existing in-
efficient and distorting schemes of tax in-
vestment incentives that have been misguid-
edly established to promote FDI. This might
imply that a number of existing special eco-
nomic zones and special regimes of invest-
ment activity must be maintained. However,
the proliferation of such schemes should
stop.
•  FDI promotion must be non-discriminatory
and must ensure that the private sector
benefits from foreign participation through
spill-over benefits. In special economic
zones, incentives should apply to foreign and
domestic investors alike and focus on activi-
ties with the strongest potential for spill-over
effects, including linkages between foreign
and domestic firms, education, training, and
research and development. Concerning other
investors’ rights, these should first be ad-
dressed by provisions favouring non-
discrimination of foreign investors in land
ownership.